









This paper critically engages contemporary discussions in intercultural philosophy 
and critical theory in light of achieving a profound critique of grand ideological 
schemes, propounding a model for an emancipatory praxis and the inclusion of the 
other in the dominant discourse. Intercultural philosophy tries to deconstruct the 
Eurocentrism of the philosophical tradition and in return introduces a 
reconstructive project centered on the embedded nature of cognition and the 
culturally oriented nature of philosophy. Critical social theory constitutes a 
critique of grand metaphysical systems that divorce theory from praxis and the 
transcendent from the transient. In return it tries to introduce an emancipatory 
praxis inspired by Hegelian-Marxism, is dialectical, reflexive, analyzes the 
contradictions of modernity and is interdisciplinary. Intercultural philosophy and 
critical social theory share a common interest in standing against grand 
metaphysical systems and centering on everyday centers of learning. Through such 
a critical exposition of the confines of intercultural philosophy and critical social 
theory, this paper argues that both approaches, (1) fail to go beyond the 
Eurocentric grand narrative of modernity that legitimizes Western ideology and is 
antithetical to the lived experiences of the other, (2) both approaches ultimately 
run into the problem of value incommensurability and (3) both approaches fail to 
introduce a quasi-transcendental foundation that both translate contending 
worldviews while simultaneously affirming the place of the other. Finally I will 
introduce an alternative model founded on the idea of multiple modernities which 
situates modernity as being situated in diverse cultural backgrounds.  
 








                                                          





“How communication and understanding between philosophers is possible at all” 
Wimmer Franz Martin, Essays on Intercultural Philosophy 
Humanity is currently embarking on the greatest stage of societal transformation 
exhibited in recent history. From the Syrian refugee crisis to migration in different 
corners of the world, heightened stage in the magnitude of fundamentalism, 
ethnicity and nationalism, to the attempt to go beyond free market capitalism, the 
world is truly witnessing a great societal transformation. Trying to demystify such 
a paradox, diverging interpretations of the nature of contemporary society and the 
quest for normativity and individuation have been proposed. Steunebrink and Van 
der Zweerde (2004) argue that in an advance of Huntington’s thesis of the clash of 
civilizations, the Western model of political modernity is being challenged by 
Islamic fundamentalism. One as such should “consider Modernity to be a 
particular type of civilization, comprising a variable constellation of three major 
factors, namely civil society, religion, and the nation, against a specific cultural 
background, and within the framework of a political order (a polity) usually called 
‘the state’”(2004: I). Going beyond the clash of civilizations, others emphasize the 
crucial role played by risk as an organizing factor in social and political relations in 
contemporary society. 
Here, Beck (1992) observes that in the current intellectual landscape, we are 
possessed with the ‘post’ thinking, seeking to go beyond material production, 
modernity and the values of enlightenment. Modernity’s quest for progress and 
postmodernity’s zeal for difference are both challenged. As such: 
 
Those who now cling more tightly than ever to the Enlightenment 
with the premises of the nineteenth century against the onslaught 
of 'contemporary irrationality' are challenged every bit as 
decisively as those who would wash the whole project of 
modernity, along with its accompanying anomalies, down the river 
(1992: 10). 
 
The dissatisfaction also extends to postmodernism. Harvey (1992) assumes 
that although initially postmodernism was conceived as a fashion of the day, it 
gradually gained momentum and redefined the whole of human relations and 
existence. In such a context, one needs, “to enquire more closely into the nature of 
postmodernism, not so much as a set of ideas but as a historical condition that 
required elucidation” (Ibid: x). We need to approach postmodernism as such not 
based on a history of ideas but a radical transformation in our way of life and the 
creation of a space for authenticity. 
For Treanor (2006) the emergence of non-comparable perspectives none of 
which is superior destroys the foundation for a common destiny, legitimacy and 
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normativity. In such a world “, we are unable to confidently place the various 
others we encounter in a system that allows us to make accurate judgments about 
them”(2006:2).Undermining the entire foundation of human civilization, such 
opening up of a space encapsulates the inclusion of the other. Metaphysically, the 
other is conceived as something that is found outside of us whereas the ethical 
dimension constitutes finding a lasting solution and answer for the challenge of 
otherness. Thus: 
 
In the most basic sense, the question of otherness asks us to 
consider what it means for something or someone to be other than 
the self; however, the question is more frequently asked in terms 
of our ability or inability to understand some particular example of 
otherness (Treanor 2006: 2). 
 
For some like Anthony Giddens we are living in a world of globalization 
where modernity is elevated to a universal level and as such “rather than entering a 
period of post-modernity, we are moving into one in which the consequences of 
modernity are becoming more radicalized and universalized than before” (Giddens 
1996: 3). The other is here treated as the South, the non-Western and the 
marginalized.  For others like Lyotard we are in a postmodern world where visions 
of emancipation and utopia are abandoned for smaller narratives. Here 
postmodernism’s, “principle is not the expert’s homology but the inventor’s 
paralogy” (Lyotard 1984: xxv). Going beyond such debate Treanor found an 
alternative approach that could be explained amongst others in Emmanuel Levinas’ 
departure that treats the other as unique and not a thing. Here, “rather than seeking 
to eliminate otherness by grasping it and analyzing it in order to reduce it to a 
known quantity, his philosophy seeks to preserve the otherness of the other and to 
respect the difference that distinguishes the other from the self” (Treanor 2006: 5). 
In this paper, through an analysis of intercultural philosophy and critical theory, I 
will argue that although conceptions of critique, emancipation and otherness 
find expression in such approaches, still both run into the problem of eurocentrism
 and incommensurability. 
In section one; I will try to critically expose the dynamism between migration, 
intercultural discourse and the quest for inclusive participation. This is followed by 
the introduction of intercultural philosophy as an orientation that tries to critique 
Western ideology, envisages model of emancipation and proposes an inclusion of 
the other in mainstream discourse, in section two. In section three, the reflexivity 
and dialogical nature of critical social theory is situated in terms of introducing a 
critique of ideology, immanent critique and emancipation as the goal of critical 
praxis. Finally, in section four, a critique of intercultural philosophy and critical 




incommensurability and the notion of multiple modernities as an attempt to create 
a space for the participation of cultural programs in the discourse of modernity.  
In such a world of migration, intercultural discourse and communication is 
regarded as a way of identifying underlying structural patterns, proposing 
dialogical encounters and proposing solutions to cross cutting issues like economic 
development, terrorism and destruction of the environment. For Paulston et al. 
(2012) in attempts to understand intercultural, there is a need to engender a 
transition from an essentialist conception that views cultures as fixed, natural, 
unchanging and metaphysically different into a discursive one that emphasizes 
cultures as created, symbolizations and formations in our language, imaginations 
 
Globalization, Intercultural Discourse and the Inclusion of the other 
In the world of globalization, the interaction amongst nations, cultures and 
communities is being furthered by diverse factors ranging from the latest 
developments in science and technology, the culture industry, public spheres and 
the media, liberalization policies, discursive practices and migration. Particularly, 
due to migration, dynamism is taking place amongst individuals and cultures, and 
one daily comes across the other and contemplates otherness. Here for Epstein and 
Gang (2010) in the dynamics between migration and cultural participation amongst 
individuals, fusion into others and total seclusion are the two dominant responses. 
Furthermore, amongst others, one feature of migration on a global scale is migrants 
selecting particular destination and also settling alongside particular identities. One  
sees “the clustering of immigrants in ethnic communities” (2010: 2).  
 
Migration and the Dynamics of Intercultural Discourse 
Currently one witnesses, a south-north migration fueled by primarily political 
factors, economic needs and also a south-south migration relying on values, 
cultures, linguistic reasons and other factors. The most important factor that is 
driving the migration dynamics is political instability. The masses resort to 
migration out of the need to escape dictatorial regimes, suppression of human 
rights and exploitation in their respective nations. Some of the political 
circumstances serving as causes for migration are, “political instability, sudden and 
dramatic regime changes, ethnic tensions and confrontations, and proxy civil wars” 
(Agadjanian 2008: 414).There are eight main gateways that characterize the current
 international migration for Solimano (2010). These include the difficulty of
 arriving at mutual understanding on the crisis and the simultaneous economic
 growth and disparity initiated by such migration. As such, “a main concern of
 current globalization is the contrasting disparities in economic levels, living
 standards and economic potentials across nations”(2010: 10).The migration 
dynamics also consists of prioritizing material growth over intrinsic values, and 
migration being more accessible to the educated than the laboring masses.  
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and perceptions. As such, “whether culture is viewed as nation, as ethnicity, as 
faith, as gender, or as sexuality, all these cultures have one thing in common: they 
are imagined communities” (2012: 5). 
For Monaghan (2012) initially the study of intercultural communication 
assumed the form of teaching foreign language to Americans but eventually 
branched out into the analysis and comparison of languages from the orient with 
the occident. As such: 
 
While intercultural communication began as exploration of the 
practical topic of how to teach people to communicate well in 
contexts where they were interacting with people from other 
cultures, discourse analysis’s roots were in the general exploration  
of the relationship between language and culture. (Ibid: 22-23) 
 
Emphasizing discourse analysis in communication and symbolic ways of life, 
currently the interaction between the study of language across cultures and its 
discursive formation are emphasized. By situating communication in society, 
values, power relations and material production, there is an attempt to envisage a 
dialogical encounter amongst participants. 
 
The Emergence of Otherness and the Other 
For Rüsen (2004) our historical encounters of the West are permeated by the 
ethnocentric tendency to prioritize one’s self and culture over others. As such, 
“much international and intercultural discourse about historiography is influenced 
by a way of historical thinking deeply rooted in human historical consciousness 
and that works throughout all cultures and in all times: ethnocentrism”(Ibid: 118). 
The solution, in return, resides in conceiving development of societies as situated, 
opening up of a space for the unique self and seeing multifaceted experience as an 
alternative. 
Otherness presupposes an ontological separation of others from one’s world 
and practical relations of asymmetry in the world. This for Martinez (2015) 
concentrates on the division between groups, the powerful and the powerless. Still, 
going beyond the critique of the other as a response to existing relations, the 
genuine self, needs to seek not absolute freedom but a space to articulate its nature. 
Accordingly, “the human ability to other allows for detachment to happen in social 
and personal relationship, which affects the self-perception and identity” (Ibid: 
153). Recognizing the relation of interdependence between the dominant self and 
its other, two major impositions on the self must be affirmed. These constitute, 
societal forces having an impact on class divisions, ethnic lines and constitution of 
the individual psyche amongst others and relational ones encompassing our 




one who can identify the social impositions, which oppress or privilege oneself and 
recognize the balance of all social roles in relation to personal experience and 
formation”(Ibid: 158). 
Having discussed the mutual relationship which exists between migration, 
intercultural discourse and otherness, I now try to introduce a philosophical 
The notion of the other or otherness cannot be analyzed without affirming its 
intrinsic relation to the problem of evil. In return, the problem of evil could be 
understood as having a relation to language, individuation, power relations, 
normative presuppositions, conceptions of the world and ultimate reality. Schrag 
(2006) argues that moral evil could be inflicted once we conceive others as 
belonging outside one’s realm and thereby turning the other into evil. Here, 
“estrangement as a coefficient of otherness, otherness under the conditions of 
estrangement, the other as stranger or alien, provides the mark of the separateness 
of finitude somehow gone wrong” (Ibid: 151). In such a context, one needs to probe
 the issue, could the narrative of the modern state capture the historical context in
 which the other emerges in our world? On the contrary, Schrag argues that
 otherness and evil would still grow on divisions fostered by conflicting cultures
 and civilizations. Here, going beyond philosophy and politics, a conception of gift
 that expects nothing in return in opposition to the politics of friendship is the only
 viable solution. As such “an economic gift of love at once transforms the restricted
 notion of friendship into a universal fraternity and sorority and sets the condition
 for the requirement to love even one's enemies” (Schrag, 2006: 154). 
Staszak (2008) assumed that the other refers to an inferior that is excluded 
from proper culture; othering refers to the systematic creation of an outside to 
establish relations of hierarchy while otherness consists of the features of the 
excluded. Conceptually, the notion of otherness still became manifest 
geographically where one gazes at the difference of others in their spatio-temporal 
location. The other as such is not full in its own lifeworld, but only emerges in a 
reference to the dominant self and culture. Based on this, “otherness and identity 
are two inseparable sides of the same coin. The other only exists relative to the 
self, and vice versa” (2008: 2).The Western othering of others is unique since it is
 informed by the quest for logical identity and dichotomous operations and is also
 practically instilled by Western imperialism. Generally, “all societies create the
 self and the other with their own set of categories” (Ibid: 3).Here as Lipner (1993)
 observes, the awareness of the existence of different identities, value systems and
 forms of life existed throughout the history of philosophy. Still, what is striking
 about the current world is affirming such challenge and even seeing it as a
 foundation for pluralism and difference. Thus, “truth is widely perceived today as
 entailing a contextual awareness so that philosophies reducing truth to the realm of
 atomic propositions fail to convince” (Ibid: 154). 
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response to cultural diversity and the need to introduce a pluralistic element in the 
philosophical tradition under the orientation of intercultural philosophy. 
 
Intercultural Praxis, Critique of Eurocentrism and the Inclusion of the 
Other 
For Shen (2011) in the globalized world, comparative and intercultural 
explorations are animated by a need to go beyond one’s surroundings and the need 
to reevaluate the credibility of one’s values upon encountering the existence of 
others. Here, “comparative studies in philosophy, religion, social sciences and 
culture, etc., always presuppose and indeed involve, on the one hand, the existence 
of many others and the act of going outside of oneself to many others, and, on the 
other hand, a deeper understanding of one’s true self and potentiality, and the 
precious values accumulated in one’s own tradition” (Shen 2011: 2). Shen assumes 
that multiculturalism should be augmented by an intercultural drive that initiates 
dialogical encounters and understands the diverse situated manifestations of a 
cultural space. Here, “especially in this time of radical change, any 
philosophy/religion capable of facing this challenge has to include in itself an 
intercultural dimension” (Ibid: 3).The goal resides in revolving between 
particularities and existing alongside one another, progress and genealogy amongst 
cultures. 
 
Wimmer, Intercultural communication and Polylogical Encounters 
Even before the development of intercultural philosophy, the human sciences 
always reserved a place for a possible encounter amongst cultures. Still, without 
succumbing to mere relativism and dictating all philosophy by value-laden 
orientations, intercultural philosophy demonstrates the dialectic between the 
universal and the particular. Accordingly, “the fact that every philosophical 
tradition has its own cultural background must not lead necessarily to a 
determinism and cultural relativism” (Kaltenbacher 2014: 40). In such intercultural 
ventures the analysis of the past, existing relations and structures must be coupled 
with different dimensions of understanding, theoretical constructs and knowledge 
of the environment. And as such, “intercultural” is the proper term because “it 
carries not just the in-between, but the active sense of interaction, confrontation, 
and even conflict” (Liu 2013: 194). 
For the possibility of intercultural philosophy, a place for translation amongst 
contending perspectives and diverse philosophical traditions must be available. As 
such, “pre-empting an account of intercultural philosophy, if it is to be possible at 
all, has to be assumed that different cultures, languages, traditions, religions, 
values, and practices are not incommensurable” (Ozoliņš 2013: 19). Ozoliņš argues 




influence the spirit of intercultural encounters thereby making it one sided. In such 
a context, “we do not have intercultural philosophy, but rather, we find that we 
inter cultural philosophy, that is, we bury the culturally distinct philosophy of the 
smaller country” (Ozoliņš, 2013: 22). Since no one could ever resolve issues 
regarding philosophical methodology and goals, it is better to engage in different 
issues that enrich the human experience and articulate diverse points of discussion. 
The intellectual challenge in the world of globalization constitutes the need to 
account for the proliferation of diverse philosophical outlooks. Thus, “amidst a 
period of globalization of many aspects of human life, the problem now arises, 
whether there will be one single form of method of philosophy in the future” 
(Wimmer 2002: 7). For Wimmer, one could unearth diverse empirical and 
conceptual tools that demonstrate what diverse cultures contributed to the 
philosophical tradition. In proposing to answer the question how is philosophy 
possible in a world of seemingly incommensurable modalities, Wimmer tries to 
consider “how communication and understanding between philosophers is possible 
at all” (Ibid: 9). As part of such an attempt, there is a need to critique Western 
historiography, identify the structural element in philosophical claims and the 
limits of ethnophilosophy as a resolution to the objectivism/relativism dichotomy.  
According to Wimmer, there is an attempt to relegate non-Western 
philosophy to the status of tradition and imitation thereby situating philosophy as 
the logic of Western culture and the most refined and qualitative Western product. 
Although occasional mentions of Confucianism and Islamic philosophy are made, 
African philosophy is treated as part of the critique of Western cultural practices. 
Here, “the preconditions and the functions of the delimitations against the foreign 
have to be analyzed” (Ibid: 12). The limitations of a common translation are 
identified by Kwasi Wiredu’s analysis of conceptual decolonization although it is 
not only modern Western and African traditional, but all languages involved that 
must be analyzed.  As such “to decolonize so many concepts by commenting and 
reviewing metropolitan languages with the means of very different languages will 
not be sufficient” (Ibid: 14). 
One major challenge in intercultural philosophy arises from the fact that 
claims in language are particular, nationalistic, and stand against universalism and 
objectivity. For Wimmer, the cultural and transient is attractive to the postmodern 
although it also levels the distinction between reason and emotion, philosophy and 
literature. Amongst others, one witnesses that the critique of ideology itself 
becomes ideological in ethnophilosophy’s zeal to assert the supremacy of one’s 
cultural background. As part of the solution, Wimmer proposes affirming the 
existence of different voices and cultural constructs, seeking shared grounds and 
thinking of philosophical traditions in the continuum between culture and 
universality. Such a quest “will be a continuation of the project of European 
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enlightenment with different means, not only by relying on a unique method of 
science, but by creating a polylogue of traditions” (Ibid: 25). 
In considering different modes of interaction amongst philosophical 
traditions, Wimmer analyzes a stage where one model is superior, another where, 
one is imitating the other model, mutually incompatible centers and finally a 
polylogue where learning takes place amongst cultures. Only considering the 
possibility of a polylogue from a logical and not a factual standpoint, Wimmer 
argues that in reality equality is unattainable and there will always be a unique 
other. Thus, “it is important to ask whether such an ideal can serve as a regulative 
idea for practicing philosophy on a global scale” (Ibid: 29). Different communities 
of the world continually strive for recognition by others and seek to exert their 
dominance in the world of meaning and technical mastery.  
In today’s world of societal change and transformations, Wimmer exposes 
diverse ways of holding onto the past. Traditionalism resides in a zeal for the 
perfect past and origin which is lost. Any dynamism here is regarded as corruptive 
and a form of degeneration. Here, “whoever is controlling the calendar is 
controlling an important part of the self-interpretation of the collective” (Ibid: 41). 
The conception of a culture could also be utopian, evolutionist and pluralistic. In 
utopianism, there is an attempt to posit a perfect ideal in the future, while 
evolutionism thrives on the idea of abandoning the past and future orientations for 
gradual change and transition. Furthermore, pluri-polar identity grows on the back 
of an eclectic approach and appropriation of diversity. As such, “it is surprising 
that nowhere we find anything like a pre natural human being (Ibid: 5). 
 
Mall, Postmodernity and the Celebration of Difference 
For another major advocate of intercultural philosophy, Mall (2000) while 
transculturality emphasizes going beyond particular sites and cultures into the 
global, interculturality centers on context tied claims to universality, the embedded 
nature of cognition and the role of cultures as cores for universal claims to truth. 
Going beyond relativism’s affirmation of separated sites of knowledge and 
universalism’s ideal of truth divorced from contexts; interculturality resides in the 
dialectic between the universal and the particular. As such, “the tendency to 
absolutize oneself exclusively ultimately leads to deadlock, for different absolute 
positions, when confronted with one another, automatically relativize themselves” 
(2000: 3). Mall believes that intercultural philosophy shouldn’t be understood as a 
branch of philosophy, a philosophical tradition, mere collection of approaches, 
recourse to the past or an aesthetic form of critique. Thus, “intercultural philosophy 
is the name of an attitude for the deep philosophical conviction that the one 
philosophia perennis is the exclusive possession of no one particular philosophical 




Within the postmodern discourse, Mall identifies a strong version which 
resides in the relativization of all claims to truth and a weak one that sees culture as 
a manifestation of plurality, seeks to identify shared spaces and promotes 
encounters amongst cultures. For Mall, the weak version of postmodernity just like 
interculturality, supports the situated nature of philosophical traditions without 
failing either to the relativist or objectivist positions. Such a weak version “tries to 
work out overlapping amongst cultures, philosophies, and religions without, of 
course, denying, reducing, or explaining away the presence of diversity” (Ibid: 40). 
Mall is also critical of Habermas’ theory of communication which, “makes itself 
immune to all of the different social and manipulative factors by constructing an 
ideal speech situation” (Ibid: 39). Furthermore, it is practically difficult to find an 
empirical ground for such a theory of communication.  
McGhee (2011) considers both classical philosophy and comparative 
philosophy as being engaged in an esoteric quest for wisdom. Based on this, “the 
origins of philosophical estrangement from the world must lie in the exposure to its 
cynical view of knowledge and opinion as instruments of policy and power” (Ibid: 
26). Surpassing such comparative ventures, polylogical dynamism amongst 
multiple partners is introduced in intercultural philosophy. The idea of a polylogue 
for Chen (2010) underscores the multiple encounters existing in our world and the 
fact that our sense of self is formed in our interaction with others. Based on this, it 
tries to expand the centers of truth from two to multiple partners. Dialogue is 
useful as a critical encounter amongst participants, still a polylogue resonates more 
with the diversity of values and ways of life in our world. As such, “accentuating 
the importance of the polylogue does not indicate the dialogue to be an obsolete 
form of communication” (Ibid: 54). 
Issues like defining the nature of philosophy, what animates philosophy and 
its dynamism with other forms of knowledge and everyday life are crucial 
challenges to intercultural philosophy. It is presumed that “what the project of 
intercultural philosophy brings to philosophies characteristic of particular cultures 
and traditions, then, is - novelty that incites development” (Sweet 2014: 186-187). 
Still, to what extent did intercultural philosophy successfully realize the 
participation of African and other cultures in the philosophical tradition? The 
intercultural orientation envisages a critique of hierarchical relations of cultures 
seeking an alternative ideal in a process of mutual learning. Accordingly, 
“intercultural philosophy is an orientation that sees philosophy as being culturally 
bound, but affirms that communication is still possible between those of different 
philosophical backgrounds”(Olu-Jacob 2014: 107). 
Bekele Gutema (2015) supports such a line of reasoning in conceiving 
philosophy as a way in which a culture critically articulates its existence and also 
engages in a re-examination of cultural values with the power of rationality being 
situated in the local context. Here, African philosophy as an enterprise constitutes 
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various strands ranging from the oral to the written, and the traditional to the 
postcolonial one which is “constituted by a wide range of philosophical texts in 
domains such as ethnophilosophy, philosophic sagacity, and social and political 
philosophy”(2015: 139-140). Besides offering a critique of Western knowledge 
systems, African philosophy could also contribute a unique philosophical response 
grounded on the African soil and inspired by existing conditions in Africa. Here a 
parallel is drawn between African philosophy and intercultural approaches since 
the conception of situated cultures striving for universality plays a dynamic role in 
both perspectives. Using Eze’s recent argument in his On Reason, Rationality in a 
World of Cultural Conflict and Racism (2008), Bekele argues that philosophy 
always originates in specific context and is temporal regardless of the particular 
form it assumes. Currently due to limitations in the mode of presentation and not 
properly being mainstreamed into philosophical traditions, the intercultural 
dimension of African philosophy needs to be further tuned. As such, “although 
intercultural philosophy is taking root, an intercultural approach to African 
philosophy has not yet progressed as far as it should have. The contemporary 
importance of intercultural philosophy renders the use of an intercultural approach 
both necessary and fruitful” (Ibid 153). 
 
Critical Theory and Immanent Critique as Emancipatory Praxis 
Whereas the proponents of intercultural philosophy propagated the cultural inputs 
of a given culture serving as the background of a philosophical tradition and 
universality as the general horizon, critical theory emerged in the background of 
the catastrophes of WWI and the need for an intellectual resolution that interferes 
in existing reality. In this section I will try to map out alternative conceptions of 
critical theory focusing on the themes of critique, emancipation and otherness. 
 
The Genesis of Critical Theory and the Notion of Emancipatory Praxis 
As Rush (2004) argues, critical theory’s origin could be situated in the attempt to 
dissociate oneself from  the social sciences and hermeneutic studies that try to 
work out the implications of German philosophy to philosophy of history. Critical 
theory on the one hand has a Marxist origin in trying to demystify the agents of 
exploitation so that existing relations will be revolutionized. On the other hand, it 
also inherited the Kantian notion of critical philosophy in focusing on the object of 
critique and the limitations of critique itself. As such, critical theory tries to 
“explicate conditions upon rationality and regards this task as implicating its 
assessment of its own rational limitations” (2004: 10). Furthermore, critical 
theorists also borrowed the notion of alienation which was first introduced by 
Hegel and later incorporated into Karl Marx’s dialectics to understand how 




conscious control” (Bronner 2011: 37). Critical theory’s appropriation of Hegel 
was met with ambivalence. While critical theorists reserved the Hegelian quest for 
an objective model of emancipation, they still identified the subject of analysis not 
as the absolute spirit but the finite, corporeal and transient. As such, “Critical 
theorists learned to interpret the particular with an eye on the totality. The moment 
of freedom appeared in the demand for recognition by the enslaved and the 
exploited” (Ibid: 2).  
Amongst the various proponents of critical theory, Horkheimer believed that 
whereas traditional theory is contemplative, reductionist and universalizing, critical 
theory couples theory and praxis, and is concerned with both critique and 
emancipation. Adorno also assumed that speculative philosophy ought to be 
replaced with a materialistic and historical analysis that traces the genesis of 
existing relations. Here, “such critique is unending, at least in the sense that the 
theorist always operates under the assumption that further critique is possible” 
(Rush 2004: 31). According to Feenberg (1981), the foundational blocks of critical 
social theory could be understood in Marx’s and Lukas’ attempts to lay down an 
account of a philosophy of praxis that goes beyond scientific socialism’s essence 
of strict administrative bureaucracy and instead emphasize the humanistic and 
emancipatory aspects of Marxism. Such an insistence is directly informed by the 
mind/body dualism. Thus, “ever since Descartes distinguished the two substances, 
philosophy and life had become more and more sharply sundered in accordance 
with this distinction” (Ibid: 5).  
Being inspired by Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society, contemporary critical theory is 
in part an attempt to address the notion of reality as a social construct and human 
relations as the driving factor for construction of reality, amalgamation of 
knowledge and practice plus analyzing the danger of scientific and technological 
rationality. Here, one needs to affirm, “The necessary involvement of a sense of 
'construction in the configuration of risk-perception” (Adam and Loon 2005: 2). 
For Delanty (2009) critical social theory must be grounded on a cosmopolitanism 
that overcomes the limits of the globalization debate by encompassing an analysis 
of societal transformation with power relations, cultural values and overcoming 
eurocentrism and also empirical studies with normative presuppositions. As such, 
“the idea of a critical cosmopolitanism is relevant to the renewal of critical theory 
in its traditional concern with the critique of social reality and the search for 
immanent transcendence, a concept that lies at the core of critical theory”(2009: 2). 
Whereas WWI resulted in the emergence of critical theory, the aftermath of 
the great depression led into its popularization in America. Particularly for Piccone 
(1976), the rise of Nazism and the tragedy of the holocaust casted doubt on critical 
theorist’s faith in reason, progress and human emancipation. As such, “it was clear 
that Nazism was a reversion to barbarism, and moreover, a monumental default on 
all the emancipatory promises of western civilization” (Ibid: 101). Resisting grand 
EJOSSAH Vol. XIII, No.1                                                              June 2017 
91 
 
metaphysical systems, critical theory underscored the interplay between human 
cognition and human interests. Thus, “by contrast, critique that is immanent or 
indwelling presupposes the criteria that are present in the situation, criteria by 
which the situation judges itself, and asks whether it meets its own raison d’être” 
(How 2003: 4-5). 
Antonio (1983), remarks that the popularization of critical theory in America 
arose from its systematic analysis of the pitfalls of both socialism and capitalism 
and combination of the analysis of values and material relations, in a general 
model of emancipation. Attempts were made to figure out the opposition between 
scientific socialism of Marxism and revolutionary praxis and critical Marxist 
advocacy of human emancipation and their influences on critical theory. As such, 
“scientific Marxism stresses the need for party organization to guide a proletarian 
revolution - in contrast, critical Marxism abandons concepts of bureaucratic party 
organization and historically inevitability for themes of emancipatory 
consciousness, mass action and revolutionary spontaneity”(Ibid 1983: 327). 
Besides its popularization in different parts of the world, critical theory is also 
characterized by the dominance of individual thinkers who set its foundations in 
different forms of emancipatory practice.  
 
From a Critique of Ideology to a Totalized Critique of Rationalism  
One of the major advocates of earlier critical theory is Herbert Marcuse. For 
Kellner (2001) Marcuse’s critical theory is essentially an attempt to unravel the 
metaphysical foundations of Marxism, enrich it with the analysis of the subjective 
world of the concrete individual and highlight the maximal role of communal, 
normative and individual quest alongside power relations and material production. 
Furthermore, Marcuse, “believed that Marxism neglected the problem of the 
individual and throughout his life was concerned with personal liberation and 
happiness, in addition to social transformation” (Ibid: 3). Marcuse, using a 
Freudian analysis arrives at the observation that the development of technical 
progress, human societies, material production and instrumental rationality stood 
against the freedom of the subject. Here, “the methodical sacrifice of libido, its 
rigidly enforced deflection to socially useful activities and expressions, is culture” 
(1974: 3).  
For Horkheimer (2002) the conventional conception of theory focuses on the 
strict compartmentalization of research domains, objectivity of researchers, 
development of abstract theories and fetishizing concrete human relations as if 
they are natural and universal facts. Accordingly, “the traditional idea of theory is 
based on scientific activity as carried on within the division of labor at a particular 
stage in the latter's development (2002: 197). As Hoy and McCarthy see it, 




produced consciously in a specific cultural context, and challenges, the view of 
theory as value free and devoid of any interests. Hence, for Hoy and McCarthy, 
 
unlike ‘traditional theory’, then, critical social theory takes as 
topics of investigation the reflexivity of social research, the 
division of labor-including scientific and scholarly labor- in which 
it is carried on, and its social functions… It reflects, in particular, 
on the contexts of its own genesis and application, that is, on its 
own embeddness in the social matrix out of which it arises and 
within which it will find its uses (1994: 15). 
 
In Horkehimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment one observes a shift 
in critical theory from the critique of ideology to a critique of reason as such. In 
mythical thinking, what is emphasized is how things stand in an intrinsic relation 
to the whole. In this context, “only demythologization dispels this enchantment… 
the process of enlightenment leads to the desocialization of nature and the 
denaturalization of the human world” (Habermas 1987: 115). In 
‘demythologization’, the role of tradition is undermined, norms, conventions and 
rules are replaced by contestable claims to truth instead of a unitary whole, the 
world becomes differentiated into that of objects, norms and subjective one.  
As Habermas tries to show in his critique of Horkheimer and Adorno, it is 
only in the context of the rise of the value spheres of science, morality and laws 
and art replacing the power of traditions and myths, that one could make a critique 
of ideology. Hence, “if one describes the process suspended between myth and 
enlightenment in this way, as the formation of a decentered understanding of the 
world, the place where the procedure of ideology critique enters into this drama 
can also be specified” (Habermas 1987: 115). Habermas marks, the critique of 
ideology as a moment of reflexivity in modernity. This changes, when reason itself 
is questioned or the issue whether reason itself can liberate humanity or when the 
aporia of what it means to reason are emphasized. The analysis turned from what 
reason serves in society, to what reason has led humanity in general. Hence, 
Horkheimer and Adorno; “pushed for a radicalization and self-over-coming of 
ideology critique, which was supposed to enlighten the Enlightenment about itself” 
(Ibid: 118). 
 
Habermas, the Communicative Paradigm and the Inclusion of the Other 
Currently the tradition of critical theory finds voice in Habermas’ discourse of 
modernity that attempts to rescue the project of modernity from the postmodernist 
critical theories of Foucault, Derrida and Lyotard. For Coole (1997) Habermas’ 
notion of otherness and alterity is part of his critique of postmodernism. Habermas 
construes the other not as ontologically different but as an equal participant in 
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everyday intersubjective validation. Thus, Habermas “is unable to attribute any 
emancipatory potential to alterity, or otherness, however, because his basic ideas 
concerning communicative reason and an emancipatory project of modernity are 
predicated on its exclusion” (1997: 221). Habermas attempts to reconstruct the 
Kantian spheres of reason and Hegelian element of reason progressing in history 
through the reflexivity of language. In the process, he denies alterity and otherness 
diversely manifested in terms of the Dionysian motif, Being, unrestrained will, 
absolute subjectivity or disciplinary matrix. As such “Habermas' antipathy towards 
poststructuralism thus rests on his denial of any emancipatory role to alterity” 
(Ibid: 222). Habermas has further articulated the place of otherness and difference 
in his ideas on human rights as encapsulating both normative grounds as well as 
legal guidelines. Thus, “he argues that human rights are not simply moral rights, 
but are Janus-faced with one side related to law and the other to morality” (Flynn 
2003: 431). 
Habermas’ solution to the issues of alterity and otherness, tries to go beyond 
two major extremes. First of all, tolerance is seen as a rule describing what is 
intolerable, and intolerance leading to tolerance. Secondly, we tolerate what we 
don’t accept and consent with. As such, “the two aspects of the paradox of 
tolerance - arbitrariness and paternalism-arise from the way in which the norms of 
tolerance are decided and justified” (Thomassen 2006: 440). The possibility of 
inclusion and tolerance is made possible by two-level integration in politics and 
ethics. In the rationalization of the life world, the ethical realm deals with the 
interests of the subject and the moral with collectivities. Such a process is 
democratic in utilizing the input of everyday individual and universalistic in 
realizing the participation of all individuals ideally. As Thomassen remarks,  the 
fact that normative principles originate within a given context inclines the nature of 
tolerance and otherness more towards the individual and the ethical perspective. 
Habermas imposes an idealized conception of rationality to realize symmetry in 
the politics of tolerance and an alternative model of tolerance and otherness where 
“the condition of possibility of inclusion and tolerance is simultaneously their 
limit” (Ibid: 447). 
Cronin and Greiff (1998) argue that Habermas’ quest for tolerance, 
recognition, and otherness form an integral aspect of his political philosophy. Such 
a philosophical deliberation recognizes the enforcing and regulative mechanism of 
legal systems on one hand and their quest for rationality and legitimation on the 
other hand. Here one asks, “What is the ground of the validity of the principle of 
justice that form the core of modern democratic constitutions?”(1998: viii) 
Habermas’ conception of otherness just like Rawls starts off by affirming the 
existence of diversity in the contemporary world. Still, whereas Rawls is skeptical 




force of the better argument and the universal validity of claims lays the 
foundation for universalistic horizons and public spheres of truth. 
As Habermas (1998) remarks in his The Inclusion of the other morality must 
be founded in rationality, intersubjective recognition and validity. By continual 
reflection, identities are created and recreated in a transitory manner. Accordingly, 
“The "inclusion of the other" means rather that the boundaries of the community 
are open for all, also and especially for those who are strangers to one another and 
want to remain strangers” (Ibid: xxxvi). Soon recognizing pluralistic conceptions 
of the good and the good life, individuals, communities and identities will engage 
in a process of legitimation through the force of the better argument. Here, “in the 
absence of a substantive agreement on particular norms, the participants must now 
rely on the neutral fact that each of them participates in some communicative form 
of life which is structured by linguistically mediated understanding “(Ibid: 40).  
Intercultural philosophy systematically creates the other that has so far been 
excluded from mainstream discourse, which is negated by Western ideology and is 
unique in its culture, and ways of life. Here just like the colonial sciences, 
intercultural philosophy also operates within the distinction between modern and 
traditional, individualistic and communal, objectifying and affirming oneness with 
 
Incommensurability, Critique of Eurocentrism and Multiple 
Modernities 
In the previous sections, I tried to analyze the quest for the other in the world of 
globalization, in the interplay between universality and particular cultures and 
otherness  as an integral  aspect  of  today’s democratic societies.  Here,  I will 
articulate my critique of intercultural philosophy and critical theory centered on 
themes of eurocentrism and incommensurability and situating the notion of 
multiple modernities as an alternative paradigm for the recognition of otherness. 
 
Eurocentrism and the Quest for the Other 
The approaches of intercultural philosophy and critical theory are founded on the 
attempt to develop sensitivity to relations of asymmetry through a critique of a 
metaphysical thinking that grounds existing human relations. Despite such 
attempts, both approaches end up implicitly affirming the superiority of Western 
culture. Intercultural philosophy affirms eurocentrism in following the colonial 
sciences that create a false notion of otherness, using Western conceptual 
distinctions to analyze intercultural encounters and failing to interrogate the 
foundations of the present global order in relations of exploitation and asymmetry. 
Critical theory also succumbs to eurocentrism in limiting its analysis of critique 
and emancipation to the contradictions of capitalistic mode of production within 
the Western soil, failing to interrogate the foundation of Western modernity in 
colonialism and imperialism.   
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nature, written and oral to establish the unique position of the other in intercultural 
discourse. Upon recognition of the role of the sciences in justifying colonialism, 
colonial science for some refers to the body of knowledge produced in the age of 
colonialism. For others it refers to the type of scientific enquiry carried out within 
the colonies. Amongst others different disciplines like anthropology and 
archaeology have been charged with propagating eurocentrism and facilitating the 
negation of the other. 
As Pels puts it, anthropology as a study that emerged within the colonial 
discourse and its practitioners are still trying to dissociate themselves from such a 
colonial legacy. “The discipline descends from and is still struggling with 
techniques of observation and control that emerged from the colonial dialectic of 
Western governmentality” (1997: 164). Pels adds that some anthropologists see 
colonialism as an integral aspect of history, others perceive colonialism as a 
procedure which requires subjugation for the advancement of societies, while still 
others see colonialism as a manifestation of the fact that societies progress through 
adaptation. Going beyond anthropology Sheperd (2002) identifies the colonial 
spirit of marginalization in the introduction of archaeology in Africa. Diversely 
phrased in terms of Africa as the cradle of humanity, precursor to human 
civilizations, the archaeological studies neglect genuine diversity and end up 
establishing Europe’s quest for self-affirmation. Thus, “such sites of political 
identification span the range of issues of race, culture, and identity, and have 
placed archaeologically constructed knowledge in relation to phenomena of 
colonialism, nationalism, apartheid, slavery, and neocolonialism” (Sheperd 2002: 
189). Intercultural philosophy just like the colonial sciences, pictures nonwestern 
cultures as exotic worlds waiting to be explored and the seats of difference that 
represent the other of the Western world.  
According to Blocker (1999), both the word “philosophy” and philosophy as 
an intellectual exercise are normatively oriented in their nature. Although, to avoid 
bias and prejudice in presenting the views of others, the best way is usually seen as 
trying to expound the thoughts and philosophies of others on “their terms”, this 
proves problematic for a number of reasons. One, getting sufficient access about 
the thoughts of others is difficult.  Two, even if we could gather vast information, 
still understanding goes beyond awareness to things like integration and becoming 
part of the other. Three, even if we succeed in becoming part of others, still using 
our own categories, interests, problematic and concepts is needed. 
In exposing the eurocentrism of critical theory, Kaye and Strath (2000) argue 
that although, modernity propounded a model of rationality driving human 
progress and history, such a quest was coupled with ideology and degenerated into 
relations of destruction. The proclaimed subjective rationality, empirical sciences 
and technological advancements also facilitated genocide, destruction of human 




human action proved to be an explosive mixture insofar as they took the world to 
the brink of atomic war which challenged the right to life itself” (Kaye and Strath 
2000: 11). Positing a contemplative and idealized rationality against mythology 
and emotions, modernity and enlightenment introduced categories, orders and 
classifications that subjugated the other. Thus, “abstraction and classification 
effaced the face, when the owner of a category was transformed from being an 
individual to a specimen” (Ibid: 15). 
Ferrara (2002) proposes a thesis of authenticity that goes beyond the modern 
vs. postmodern debate in critical theory. On the one hand, using intersubjective 
validation as a foundation, it is argued that the limitations of modernity and the 
critical project reside not in material foundations, but philosophical 
conceptualizations of idealist metaphysics and philosophy of the subject. On the 
other hand, abandoning modernity as a lost cause, a postmodern world is 
inaugurated where the center cannot hold and claims to truth are concealed in 
claims to power and meaning. Here, “the alternative of bringing the project of 
modernity to completion versus abandoning it altogether, however, is somehow 
too crude and even misleading” (2002: 149). Introducing a third approach, Ferrara 
focused on going beyond the dichotomous relations between cognition and praxis 
and the notions of postcolonial enlightenment and postcolonial critical theory. 
In the eyes of Festa and Carey (2009) postcolonial enlightenment requires an 
epistemological restructuring of Western cultures’ perception towards others, and 
also a moral dimension that furthers genuine relations of symmetry. This is also 
founded on the recognition that, “the introduction of postcolonial theory into the 
field of eighteenth-century studies has generally left Enlightenment relatively 
untouched” (2009: 2). The process of freedom and emancipation declared by 
enlightenment are currently undermined as Western projects, sources of 
exploitation and essentially anti-diversity and ideological in creating the other as 
illogical and emotive. Hence, “In as much as its values are identified as 
coextensive with modernity, the Enlightenment naturalizes a teleology in which all 
roads lead inexorably to an episteme associated with the West” (Ibid: 8). Thus 
whether conceived in terms of Habermas’ unfinished project of modernity or the 
farewell to enlightenment in the postmodern critique of reason, critical theory did 
not recognize the relation between enlightenment and colonialism as well as the 
creation of the other as the other side of enlightenment. 
 
Value Incommensurability as a challenge to Intercultural Philosophy and 
Critical Theory  
The approaches of intercultural philosophy and critical theory are founded on a 
quasi-transcendental methodology that identifies the underlying presuppositions of 
the embedded nature of human cognition and everyday praxis. Specifically in 
Habermas, one finds an approach that revolves between idealizing presuppositions 
EJOSSAH Vol. XIII, No.1                                                              June 2017 
97 
 
and fallibility approach, universality of validity claims and everyday speech acts. 
This still leaves out the question, how does one reconcile different grounds of 
critique, life worlds, horizons of meaning and spaces for emancipatory praxis? The 
challenge of incommensurability was introduced by Thomas Kuhn as a way of 
situating the logical outcomes of scientific revolutions and the change of 
paradigms. Kuhn situated incommensurability as the fact that semantic difficulties 
complicate translation amongst paradigms. Kuhn argues, “the claim that two 
theories are incommensurable is then the claim that there is no language, neutral or 
otherwise, into which both theories, conceived as sets of sentences, can be 
translated without residue or loss” (1982: 670). Kuhn’s thesis of 
incommensurability could be analyzed methodologically in terms of the lack of a 
common standard amongst paradigms, perceptually in terms of scientists within 
paradigms experiencing the world in different terms and semantically in terms of 
using different language across paradigms. It is semantic incommensurability that 
lays the foundation for value incommensurability or values within paradigms being 
incomparable with one another.  
The idea of incommensurability in intercultural communication and the social 
realm refers to the fact that the meanings in texts are always deferred, no common 
universe of discourse exists, interpretation is always embedded and seeking an 
objective stance amounts to a forceful imposition on others. Accordingly, 
“incommensurability refers to a state in which two phenomena (or worlds) cannot 
be compared by a third without producing serious distortion” (Povineli 2001: 320). 
The thesis of incommensurability and its effect on common discourse is also 
identified by linguistic anthropologists who focus on the nature of grammar and 
sociologists who identified the act of commensuration as one that is potentially 
detrimental to the diversity of worldviews and also individual autonomy since 
meaning is forcefully imposed structurally to arrive at such consensus. One as such 
needs to ask, “What are commensuration's practical and political effects? What are 
the tensions between ethical systems and the formal rationality of 
commensuration” (Ibid: 325). 
Sankey (1991) argues that the analysis of semantic incommensurability is 
dictated by the background meaning on one side and the quest for a shared 
meaning that is limited by local worlds of meaning on the other. In such a context, 
“Since comparison must take place in some language, the question arises in which 
language theories which fail to be inter-translatable may be compared” (Ibid: 415). 
Sankey further claims that the thesis of semantic incommensurability could be 
expressed in the difference between translation as an act of expressing the 
cognitive context of one language in another and understanding as the connection 
between an individual member of a language and the language itself. Thus, “to 
understand something said in a language is to know what it means and to arrive at 




language” (Ibid: 417). Specifically, Raz assumes that the viability of the 
incommensurability of values should be explained in terms identifying the 
difference between the equality of all cultures and values vs. their 
incommensurability. Accordingly, “one must give it an interpretation which 
explains in what way incommensurability differs from equality of value” (1985: 
119) 
Our representations, frames, worldviews and backgrounds limit discourse and 
aims at mutual cooperation. Here, “the question is how we talk about culturally 
significant issues across such differences?” (Flower 2003: 39). Flower’s analysis 
of intercultural rhetoric further reveals that such attempts at communication 
embody both existing practices of individuals as well as societal dynamism, 
cultural values, ideological presuppositions and ontological foundations. For the 
existence of an intercultural encounter, shared worlds and a public sphere that 
equally accommodates diverging voices must be founded, although, “the practice 
of rhetoric has been historically identified with analogues to the Greek polis, a 
restricted, homogenous body of peers (that excluded women, foreigners, and 
slaves)” (Ibid: 43). 
 
Multiple Modernities as an alternative model for the Inclusion of the Other 
Going beyond the charges of eurocentrism and incommensurability, I think the 
approaches of intercultural philosophy and critical theory need to incorporate the 
notion of multiple modernities as an alternative model for the interpretation of 
critique, emancipation and otherness in different cultural centers of the world.  
Discontent with Western narratives of modernity and attempts to find a space 
for multiple horizons of modernity led into the inception of multiple modernities. 
Thus, “the theory of multiple modernities has been developed out of a deep sense 
of frustration with the conventional or classical theories of modernization which, in 
some scholars’ eyes, have failed to explain the diversity of modern societies found 
across the globe, especially in the second half of the twentieth century”(Ichijo 
2013: 27-28). The idea of multiple modernities conceives modernity as emerging 
in a particular cultural, social, political and institutional framework. The 
conception also does not necessarily assume that diverse modern projects will 
converge on a historical path. Thus, “the core of multiple modernities lies in 
assuming the existence of culturally specific forms of modernity shaped by distinct 
cultural heritages and sociopolitical conditions”(Eisenstadt et al. 2002: 1). Starting 
from the year 2000 and the appearance of the notion of multiple modernities in the 
Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, one witnesses a wide 
usage of the term in the analysis of modernity and discussions in the social 
sciences. 
For Eisenstadt, the world of globalization does not constitute the emergence 
of modernity in a global scale, conflicts among ideologies or a zeal for the past. On 
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the contrary, one witnesses attempts to reground the project of modernity in 
different soils and cultural programs. As such, “all these developments and trends 
constitute aspects of the continual reinterpretation, reconstruction of the cultural 
program of modernity” (2003: 517).The essence of modernity lies not in the 
continuation of the past, cumulative history or future utopian thinking but a radical 
departure and a civilization perspective and as such, “of a distinct social 
“imaginaire,” indeed of the ontological vision, of a distinct cultural program, 
combined with the development of a set or sets of new institutional formations” 
(Ibid:493). Eisenstadt further observes that western modernity encompassed both 
ideological and institutional programs. The former resides in the dissemination of 
Western cultural constructs in different corners of the world and the latter in 
constituting a system of administration over the different corners of the world. 
Rather than simply situating different cultural programs as Westernization in 
different contexts, one witnesses the advent of multiple modernities. This 
constitutes modern projects informed by respective backgrounds; diverging ways 
of understanding what it means to be modern and introducing cultural programs as 
the main forces in the quest for modernity. 
Intercultural philosophy’s quest for widening the space of intercultural 
participation and critical theory’s attempt to introduce both a critical and 
emancipatory practice could learn from the alternative model of multiple 
modernities in the following ways. The notion of multiple modernities goes 
beyond the modern vs. traditional dichotomy that the emancipatory models of 
critical theory operate within since it assumes that modernity is culturally oriented. 
It assumes that every culture aspires for novelty, progress and refinement in the 
world of other cultures and alternative ways of being. Rather than positing a 
universal path of rationalization that all cultures must go through, it assumes that 
every culture represents a unique vision of modernity. This shows that all attempts 
to evolve a model of emancipation should recognize the unique aspects of every 
cultural location and cognitive horizons. 
The approach of multiple modernities does not manufacture an other, a self 
and an identity that is the other of the enlightened west. Rather than creating false 
identities that negate the western self, it sees all cultures in a parallel representing 
diverse ways of interpreting modernity. It sees modernity as a quest that receives 
inputs from diverse spatio-temporal locations. This helps to initiate comparative 
studies among different interpretations of modernity. Multiple modernities as an 
alternative model sees the world of knowledge production as taking place in 
different sites of knowledge. Rather than seeing the fate of humanity as being 
driven by a universal logic of materialistic production, it affirms the existence of 
diverse ways of relating to the human and natural worlds. It treats 








The paper tried to critically expose the discourse on critique, emancipation and 
otherness as viewed from the perspectives of intercultural philosophy and critical 
theory. Intercultural philosophy resists ethnocentrism and centrism in the process 
of cultural encounters. This is based on the exposure of grand claims to truth, 
which yield hierarchical relations amongst cultures. Whereas expansive, 
integrative and separative centrisms added to a reductive hermeneutics 
conceptually negate the other and practically enslave other cultures; the solution 
lies in situating truth as a dialogical search residing in both the objective and 
relative aspects of the human experience. Critical theory also exhibits a critique of 
absolutist metaphysical claims and grand narratives that negated the potentials for 
emancipatory critique in everyday horizons of meaning. It also introduces models 
of emancipation that focus on exposing of contradictions, limitations of technical 
progress and the praxis of the sciences.  
The analysis subsequently revealed that both approaches fail to transcend the 
eurocentrism of the modern project and the incommensurability of values. In the 
quest for the other, comparative ventures and affirming the existence of philosophy 
in different cultural contexts, intercultural philosophy creates the other in a system 
of binary oppositions. Critical theory also fails to deconstruct the eurocentrism of 
modernity and introduces its analysis only on the contradictions of instrumental 
rationality and modern progress within the Western context. The failure of both 
intercultural philosophy and critical theory to overcome value incommensurability 
paves the ground for the exploration of multiple modernities within diverse 
cultural contexts of the world which are found in a parallel horizon all striving for 
novelty. In multiple modernities the issue of otherness disappears since all partners 
in the discourse of modernity equally strive for perfection and progress. 
Abandoning the linear progression of history and the binary opposition between 
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